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CASE NOTE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-Anaconda Co. v. Corporaci6n del Cobre, 55
F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 2735 (1973).
In the latter part of 1969, the Chilean Exploration Company
(CHILEX) and the Andean Copper Mining Company (ANDES)
transferred all of their assets and liabilities to two separate Chilean
corporations. Together with the Anaconda Company, each sold 51
percent of the stock in their various Chilean mining interests to one
defendant, Corporaci6n del Cobre (CODELCO), which made pay-
ment by promissory notes guaranteed by another defendant, Corpo-
raci6n de Fomento de la Producci6n (CORFO). In July of 1971, the
Allende government, by constitutional amendment, I nationalized the
Chilean mining industry. Involved in the nationalization were the
CODELCO and CORFO interests, as well as the remaining 49
percent interest of each of the three plaintiffs. CODELCO, now a
state agency, is responsible for operating and managing the mines.
2
Although Chilean nationalizations have been the subject of
much comment and litigation, the three plaintiff mining companies
involved in this case did not challenge the legality of the action.
Instead, they brought suit in the U.S. District Court to recover on the
promissory notes and attached two million dollars the defendants had
on deposit in U.S. banks.
The defendants moved to vacate the order of attachment giving
three arguments in support of their motion. First, they contended
that sovereign immunity prevented suit against them without their
consent, since the corporations were "organic parts of the Chilean
state that . . . were created to, and do, carry out governmental func-
1. Chile: Constitutional Amendment Concerning Natural Resources and Their
Nationalization (July 15, 1971), Law 17,450, conveniently found in 10 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1067 (1971) [hereinafter cited as the Nationalization Amendment].
2. For a closer examination of incidents leading to and occurring throughout this
nationalization period in Chile, see generally Expropriation Symposium: Proceedings
of the 1972 Regional Conference of the American Society of International Law at the
University of Denver College of Law, 2 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POLICY 125 (1972); Landau,
Economic and Political Nationalism and Private Foreign Investment, 2 DENVER J.
INT'L L. & POLICY 169 (1972); Schlesser, Recent Developments in Latin-American
Foreign Investment Laws, 6 INT'L LAWYER 64 (1972); Thome, Expropriation in Chile
under the Frei Agrarian Reform, 19 AM. J. COMp. L. 489 (1971); Wesley, Expropriation
Challenge in Latin America: Prospects for Accord on Standards and Procedures, 46
TOL. L. REv. 232 (1971); Santa Maria, Perspectives on Spanish American Legal Norms
Governing Mining Concessions, "Chileanization, "and the Concensus of Vida del Mar,
11 VA. J. INT'L L. 177 (1971); Doman, New Developments in the Field of
Nationalization, 3 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POLITICS (1970).
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tions (jure imperii)."3 Second, since the plaintiffs had already sub-
mitted their claim to a special Chilean tribunal,4 attachment should
not have been granted while the matter was sub judice there.5 Finally,
they urged vacation as an exercise of judicial discretion.
Judge Metzner, trying the case, initially held that the case could
be decided on procedural grounds alone, without addressing the con-
tentions of the defendants, since, under New York law,6 an attach-
ment may be vacated only after the defendant has made an appear-
ance and these defendants had not done so. The judge did not stop
there, however, and his holdings with respect to the contentions of the
defendants form the most interesting aspect of the opinion.
The basic question confronting the court was whether the at-
tached property was that of a foreign government and, therefore,
subject to sovereign immunity,7 or a foreign government engaged in
commercial activities,8 or a foreign corporation subject to the laws of
3. 55 F.R.D. 16, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
4. Nationalization Amendment, supra note 1, at 1069. The Amendment provides
for the establishment of a "Tribunal for hearing appeals on the amount of compensa-
tion determined by the Comptroller General utilizing a specific formula provided in
the amendment, to be paid to corporations whose interest was expropriated. The
Amendment also states that there is "no appeal available against its (the Tribunal's)
decision."
5. The case referred to has since been resolved by the Tribunal. Copper Tribunal
Decision, Diario Oficial (Aug. 1972), conveniently found at Special Copper Tribunal
Decision on the Question of Excess Profits of Nationalized Copper Companies, 11 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1013 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Copper Tribunal Decision].
6. New York CPLR § 6223 Vacating or Modifying Attachments:
. . * If, after the defendant has appeared in the action, the court deter-
mines that the attachment is unnecessary to the security of the plaintiff
it shall vacate the order of attachment. Such a motion shall not of itself
constitute an appearance in the action.
New York law is applied here in accordance with Rule 64, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure providing that attachment for the purpose of jurisdiction and execution "are
available under the circumstances and in the manner provided by the law of the state
in which the district court is held."
7. New York and Cuba Mail -S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). Plaintiff sought to recover damages sustained by its vessel by attach-
ing funds of the Republic of Korea on deposit in various New York banks. Inasmuch
as the Department of State filed a statement, recognizing that "under international
law property of a foreign government is immune from attachment and seizure," the
Court complied with the request and granted the motion to vacate the attachment.
8. Harris and Co. Advertising Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So.2d 687 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1961). Here, attachment of government funds deposited in various local banks
was upheld:
It would not be compatible with the principle of judicial powers of a
sovereign nation if funds deposited as private funds. . . used in business
type activities here, would be clothed in a vail radiating foreign sover-
eignty.
See also Pacific Molasses Co. v. Conrite de Ventas de Mulin de la Repiiblica Domini-
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the United States.' This distinction between activity which is govern-
mentally oriented and that which is commercially oriented forms the
essence of a sovereign immunity defense.'0
There are two ways to raise the question of sovereign immunity
once the merits of the controversy have been placed in issue. Either
the State Department may assert such immunity, or the claim may
be made by an accredited diplomatic representative of the foreign
state." An assertion by the State Department is usually determi-
native of the issue," as courts will generally not exercise their juris-
diction so as to embarrass the executive branch.' 3 This procedure is
not an "abrogation" of judicial power.'4 However, in the instant case
there was no intervention by the State Department. The issue was
raised only by the affidavit of the Chilean Ambassador. The court
was thus left to its own discretion in determining the merits of the
claim.' 5
cana, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 30 Misc. 2d 560 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961); National City
Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324
U.S. 30 (1945). See generally S. SUCHARITHUL, STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADE ACTIVITIES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 347-50 (1959); T. QUITLARA, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY 254-309 (1970).
9. The distinction between public acts (acta jure imperii) and private acts (acta
jure gestionii) is the foundation for the holding in the present case and will be discussed
in greater depth, infra.
10. The issue is often solved by treaty provisions which preclude the assertion of
sovereign immunity in the commercial disputes. Some examples are:
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany (signed Oct. 29, 1954), art.
18, para. 27 U.S.T. 1839, 1859, T.I.A.S. No. 3593, 273 U.N.T.S. 3,26;
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United
States and Italy (signed Feb. 2, 1948) art. 24, para. 6, 63 Stat. 2255,
T.I.A.S. No. 1965; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation be-
tween the United States and Iceland (signed Jan. 21, 1950) art. XV, para.
3, 1 U.S.T. 785, 796, 797, T.I.A.S. No. 2155, 206 U.N.T.S. 296, 288.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 71(1)(b) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
12. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945); The Schooner Ex-
change v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); Compalija Espafiola de Nave-
garian Martina, S.A.V. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 64 (1938).
13. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943). See also United States
v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882).
In such cases the judicial department of this government follows the
action of the political branch, and will not embarass the latter by assum-
ing an antagonistic jurisdiction.
14. New York and Cuba Mail S.S., supra note 7, at 685,
• . . This course entails no abrogation of judicial power, it is a self-
imposed restraint to avoid embarrassment of the executive in the conduct
of foreign affairs.
15. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisara General de Abastecimi6ntos y Trans-
portes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Victory Transport];
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, supra note 12, at 34; Ex parte Republic of Peru, supra
note 13, at 587; Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 533 (1920).
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In reaching his decision, Judge Metzner relied upon the distinc-
tion between jure imperii and jure gestionis.'" This distinction is the
basis of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, 7 and the policy
followed by the State Department since 1952.' 8 In its determination,
the court attempted to find the characteristics of a corporation which
would qualify, or disqualify, it for immunity. It looked to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Foreign Relations Law which states that the im-
munity of a foreign state "extends to. . . a corporation created under
its laws and exercising functions comparable to those of an agency of
the state."1 9 Adopting the Restatement comment, the court agreed
that the term "agency" means "a body having the nature of a govern-
16. Victory Transport, supra note 15, at 360. See also National City Bank v.
Republic of China, supra note 8; Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Instit.,
260 App. Div. 189, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 825 (1st Dept. 1940), Et Ve Blik Kuruna v.B.N.S. Int'l
Sales Corp., 240 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
17. In contrast to the restrictive theory generally used today, is the classical theory
espoused by Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange, supra note 10. The
usual point of reference for the change from the classical to the restrictive is the
eloquent dissent of Justice Mach in The Pesaro, 277 F.472 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), where he
differentiates between commercial and war vessels of governments. Recently, legal
scholars have moved toward a third theory which would virtually remove sovereign
immunity as a defense. Schmitthoff, The Nineteenth Century Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity and the Importance of the Growth of State Trading, 2 DENVER J. INT'L L. &
POLICY 199 (1972).
18. Letter of Acting Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate to Department of Justice, May
19, 1952, 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952):
• . . the Department feels that the widespread and increasing practice on
the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes nec-
essary a practice which will enable persons doing business with them to
have their rights determined in the courts. For these reasons it will
hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign govern-
ments for a grant of sovereign immunity.
For comment on the "Tate letter" see Dubrovir, A Gloss on the Tate Letter's Restric-
tive Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 54 VA. L. REv. 1 (1968); Bishop, New United
States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 93 (1953); Comment,
Restrictive Sovereign Immunity, the State Department and the Court, 62 N.W.U. L.J.
397 (1967).
19. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, at § 66. Additionally, the RESTATEMENT provides
immunity to the following areas of a foreign state:
(a) the state itself;
(b) its head of state and any person designated by him as a member of
his official party;
(c) its government or any governmental agency;
(d) its head of government and any person designated by him as a
member of his official party;
(e) its foreign minister and any person designated by him as a member
of his official party;
(f) any other public minister, official, or agent of the state with respect
to acts performed in his official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdic-
tion would be to enforce a rule of law against the state ...
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ment department or ministry,"2 and that "great weight must be
given to the fact that the foreign state considers the corporation to
be performing the functions of a governmental agency.""
On the other hand, the court noted, if a corporation is permitted
to be sued in its own country, in the same manner as a private corpo-
ration, immunity becomes highly questionable." Additionally, when
a foreign government engages in commercial activities outside the
traditional areas of government functions, the corporation, or sepa-
rate governmental entity, should be reachable.2
Relying upon the opposing affidavits, Judge Metzner found sev-
eral points against the claim of sovereign immunity. First, if the
corporations were indeed immune, then it would not have been neces-
sary for the government of Chile to join them as a party in the pro-
ceedings in the Chilean courts.24 Secondly, the terms for delivery of
the notes were in accordance with the laws of the State of New York
and the parties to the notes considered the New York office of CO-
DELCO as the domicile of the corporation. This led to the conclusion
that the defendants were not entitled to sovereign immunity.
The defendants urged application of the Victory Transport case,
where legislative acts, such as nationalization, were found to be pub-
lic acts, and sovereign immunity was granted even in the absence of
State Department suggestion. 2 However, Judge Metzner pointed out
20. Id. Comment. Reiterated in the Comment is the previous discussion stating
that:
In determining whether the agency is in fact a part of the government,
the views of the government creating the agency are given great weight,
but are not necessarily conclusive.
See also Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolier Instil., supra note 16; United
States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929)
[hereinafter cited as United States v. Deutsches].
21. Id. Reporter's Notes. Judge Metzner points out that this argument is favorable
to the defendants' point of view.
22. Id. Reporter's Notes. Judge Metzner points out that this argument is favorable
to the plaintiffs' point of view.
23. United States v. Deutsches, supra note 21; Coale v. Socit6 Co-operative
Suisse dis Charbona Basle, 21 F.2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). See also The Harvard Re-
search in International Law Art. 23, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 451, 700 (1935):
A State may permit orders or judgments of its courts to be enforced
against the property of another State not used for diplomatic or consular
purposes: (a) When the property is immovable property; or (b) When the
property is used in connection with the conduct of an enterprise...
24. Copper Tribunal Decision, supra note 4.
25. Victory Transport, supra note 15, at 360. It is stated that public acts are
generally limited to the following areas:
(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien;
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization;
(3) acts concerning the armed forces;
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that the nationalization occurred in July of 1971,26 whereas the sale,
for which the notes were issued, occurred in 1969. This prior obliga-
tion of CODELCO, therefore, was not affected by the nationalization.
The second argument urged by the defendants was that since the
plaintiffs had submitted their claims to a special Chilean court, the
matter was sub judice and the attachment should have been vacated.
This was handled rather summarily. The Special Copper Tribunal"
was established to hear appeals from those affected by nationaliza-
tion on the amount of compensation decided upon by the Comptroller
General.2 In making the decision, the Comptroller General arrived at
a negative sum. 9 This negative sum provides a unique area of set-off
for any claims against the Chilean government by those, such as the
plaintiffs, who have claims arising outside the nationalization
scheme. After joining CODELCO as a party in the appeal before the
Special Copper Tribunal, the government further asserted that any
obligation on the notes should be paid out of that compensation. The
court found it incomprehensible that the defendants could assert that
this matter was being seriously contended in Chile.
The defendants final argument urged the exercise of judicial
discretion to vacate the order. The defendants raised three grounds
which they thought rendered the exercise of judicial discretion appro-
priate. First, since the claim was for one hundred million dollars and
the attachment was on a mere two million dollars, which would not
afford the plaintiffs much relief, the attachment should have been
removed. Secondly, the attachment would have damaged trade be-
tween Chile and the United States and, therefore, have adversely
affected the U.S. balance of payments. Finally, the attachment
would have had a deleterious effect on the economy of Chile. Judge
Metzner found the arguments ludicrous, difficult to believe, and pro-
perly within the sphere of the State Department. The court then
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity;
(5) public loans.
26. Nationalization Amendment, supra note 1.
27. Nationalization Amendment, supra note 1, at 1069 (see note 3.). For further
information on the structure of the Tribunal see Regulations of the Special Copper
Tribunal, 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 147 (1971).
28. Id., see also note 3. As pointed out by Judge Metzner compensation was
determined by the Comptroller using the formula of the value of the mines less "excess
profits," rights to mineral deposits, and the value of property in poor condition. Ac-
cording to the Amendment, the "President of the Republic" is "empowered to order
the Comptroller General . . . to deduct all or part of the excess profits earned by the
nationalized companies" as determined by the President. Nationalization Amend-
ment, supra note 1, at 1069.
29. Decree Concerning Excess Profits of Copper Companies (Sept. 28, 1971), 11
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1235 (1971).
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denied the motion and vacated the temporary stay granted to the
defendants.
William B. Moody

